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Highly Cited Leaders and the  
Performance of Research Universities   
1. Introduction   
Although there is a large literature on the research productivity of 
universities1, little is known about how different types of leader affect a university s 
performance.  By creating a new longitudinal data set, I try to fill this gap.  I provide 
evidence that a university s later research performance improves if it appoints a 
president (vice chancellor) who is an accomplished scholar.  More broadly, I argue 
that in knowledge-intensive organizations, where the majority of employees are expert 
workers, having a leader who is also an expert may be beneficial to the institution s 
long-term performance.  The paper s results seem of potentially wide interest to 
policy-makers and to our understanding of R&D processes. 
Research universities are part of the knowledge-based sector (Mintzberg, 
1979).   They are an interesting case both because they are a significant source of 
innovation in society and because their leaders technical expertise can be measured 
reasonably objectively.  There have been a number of influential empirical studies of 
leaders in higher education2.   Yet there has been little statistical thinking about how 
university presidents and vice chancellors influence performance.  It seems 
appropriate to ask the question: Should top universities be led by top scholars?  A 
natural alternative idea is that a leader needs primarily high managerial ability allied 
merely to some acceptable minimum level of technical ability.  By contrast, what this 
paper s later data appear to suggest is a fairly smooth relationship between the level of 
scholarship and university quality.  My central argument is that in settings where 
expert knowledge is the key factor that characterizes an organization it is likely to be 
expert knowledge that should be key in the selection of its leader.    
Research is central to a university s success. Institutions that produce the best 
research receive the largest share of public funding and private philanthropy.   There 
                                                
1 The literature on the determinants of university research performance and innovation includes Johnes 
and Johnes, 1993, 1995; Von Tunzelmann et. al., 2003; Oppenheim and Stuart, 2004; Rigby and Edler, 
2005; Adams and Clemmons, 2006; Crespi and Geuna, 2006; Katz, 2006; Zhang and Ehrenberg, 2006 
and Charlton and Andras, 2007; Gonzalez-Brambila and Veloso, 2007. 
2 For example, Cohen and March, 1974; Birnbaum, 1988; Rosovsky, 1991; Middlehurst, 1993; Bargh 
et al., 2000 and Ehrenberg, 2004. 
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is also a significant relationship between the quality of research and the extent of 
industry funding (Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005).  
It has recently been shown that there is a positive correlation between the 
scholarly achievement of a university s president and the position of that university in 
a global ranking.  The higher a university is ranked in the Academic Ranking of 
World Universities 3, the higher the life-time citations of its leader.   This pattern has 
been replicated for deans of business schools (Goodall, 2006 a,b).   However, asking 
if scholar-leaders make a difference to the research performance of a university -- that 
is, addressing issues of causality -- means it is necessary to go beyond cross-section 
patterns.    
2. Longitudinal Evidence  
The quality of a university is established over years.  It incorporates factors 
such as an institution s history, reputation, age and wealth -- thus creating noisy 
conditions from which to isolate the contributions of individual leaders.  It may be 
possible, however, to get an indication of a leader s effect through a longitudinal 
method that uses lags, an acceptable performance measure (i.e. not league tables) and 
control variables.  Indeed, it could be argued that researchers have an obligation to 
continue to try to establish the effectiveness of leaders despite the cloudy conditions, 
because of the effort invested in recruitment and the resources paid out in employment 
(leaders are normally the highest paid in organizations, including universities).  It is 
suggested in this paper that:   
Hypothesis:  There is a positive relationship between the prior scholarly ability of a 
                       university president and the future success of that institution.  
Information from the UK is used because of the unique method of assessing 
performance that has been available in that country for a number of years the 
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)4.   The dataset constructed here covers a panel 
of 55 UK research universities, and 157 university presidents.    
                                                
3 The ranking is produced by the Institute of Higher Education at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2004. 
4 The Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) was designed to help inform UK funding bodies decisions 
about how to distribute public money for research.   
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3.   Methodology  
The hypothesis is tested by using multiple regression analysis with university 
performance as the dependent variable and the scholarly success of presidents5 as the 
key independent variable.  Control variables for university income, presidential age 
and discipline are also used.  These are incorporated to check the robustness of the 
correlations between university performance and a leader s research history.  The 
focus is on longitudinal changes in university performance.   
This study uses panel data comprising all UK research universities that 
competed three times in the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE).  Performance is 
observed in the RAE in 1992, 1996 and 2001.  To identify a president s scholarly 
success, each individual s lifetime citations have been hand-counted and normalized 
for discipline6.  An alternative would have been to use the simpler measure of a 
scholar s H-index -- see for example Oppenheim, 2007 -- but the decision was taken 
to use instead the more exact lifetime citations count.     
3.1 The Sample of Institutions  
The 55 institutions selected make up the oldest and most established research 
universities in the UK (for a list of sample institutions, see Appendix A).  They are 
often referred to as the old universities, those that existed before 1992, a period that 
marked major expansion in the number of UK higher education institutions.  This 
group have consistently generated the majority of academic research and they 
continue to receive the bulk of UK research income7. 
As suggested above, age, size, wealth and reputation are all contributing 
factors to the long-term success of any university.   But it is important to mention that 
success over the last 40 years among UK research universities has not been confined 
to one particular group.  There has been movement up and down in RAE performance 
and also in various league tables (see, for example, league tables in The Guardian 
newspaper, The Times and Times Higher Education Supplement).  In this study, one 
                                                
5 President is used here to denote the executive leader of a university. The term is used to include vice 
chancellor, principal, director, among others. 
6 Hence I do not count patent citations in the sense of Oppenheim, 1997.  
7
 Figures available from the UK Higher Education Statistics Agency, 2006. 
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that spans nine years, the data show that improvement in performance is not confined 
to the largest or the oldest institutions.     
3. 2 The Leaders  
The sample includes 157 British university presidents. They have led the 55 
universities over, approximately, a twenty-year period.  It is the presidents in place in 
1992 and 1996 that appear most in the statistical analysis.  Biographical information 
has come from Who s Who , the Association of Commonwealth Universities, and 
from individuals biographies.   
The focus in this paper is on presidents lifetime citations. These are 
normalized for discipline into a P-score, or scholarly score, and used as a proxy 
measure of each individual leader s past research productivity.   (Descriptive data on 
the sample of presidents are available in Appendix B).   
3.3 Dependent Variable: University Performance   
There are several ways to measure the long-term performance of a university.  
One of the most common, although possibly one of the least scientific, is to use the 
league tables which have become ubiquitous.  The main problem with rankings is 
their lack of consistency in assessment methodologies.  Most league tables are media-
generated, produced by commercial organisations designed to make money by selling 
their publications.  To create a story, the methodology is changed, often annually, 
which ensures that institutions at the top rotate (Lombardi et al., 2002). 
The UK has had a system for appraising research universities since 1986, one 
that takes place every four to five years.  Selectivity is on the basis of quality in that 
institutions that conduct the best research receive a larger proportion of the available 
grant.  Based on peer review, the Research Assessment Exercise provides quality 
ratings for research across all disciplines.  Panels use a standard scale to award a 
rating for each submission.  Scores are assigned to units of assessment (equivalent to 
academic departments broadly speaking) depending on how much of the work is 
judged to reach national or international levels of excellence8.   
                                                
8
 Information about RAE available from www.hero.ac.uk. 
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The Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) is the measure of university 
performance used in this study.  It was felt to be appropriate because of the emphasis 
it places on the output of academic research, which is a core function of research 
universities, the other being teaching.  Although teaching is a central activity of 
universities, it could be argued that it is research quality that top universities 
prioritize.  This seems clear from the fact that promotion within the faculty is typically 
through a peer-review process that focuses almost entirely on candidates research 
productivity.  There is some evidence in the UK that an academic department s 
teaching quality is linked to its research quality9.   
3.4 Measure of Performance  
University performance is measured here across three Research Assessment 
Exercises and is used to assess how much each university has improved or declined in 
the number of top scoring departments across these periods.  The ratings have 
changed over the different assessment exercises, but generally they range from 1 to 5-
star (signified here as 5*) which is the highest grade.  The paper s focus is on 
improvement in the number of departments that achieved the highest scores in the 
RAE10.  These grades are synonymous with research considered, by peer-review, to be 
of international excellence.  Achieving the very top grades is a challenging task 
because excellence must be reached across almost all faculty in a given unit of 
assessment11.   
University performance is, then, measured here by comparing the growth, or 
decline, in the number of departments graded excellent in the Research Assessment 
Exercise.    These figures are generated both for the level of the number of units and 
also as growth in the changes over time for each of the sample institutions.   
Have the mover universities moved in part because their leaders were better 
scholars?  To understand whether university performance in the Research Assessment 
                                                
9 In the UK a separate measure for teaching quality was established by government Teaching Quality 
Assessment (TQA).  TQA scores have been shown to correlate highly with RAE scores (Shattock, 
2003).  In other words, those institutions that perform best in the RAE tend to obtain the highest TQA 
scores also.     
10 These are 5A*, 5B* and 5A.  In RAE 1992 the three top scores were 5A, 5B and 5C. 
11 I chose to use the highest grades (i.e. 5A*, 5B* and 5A) because in RAE 1996 a third of all 
submissions received a grade somewhere in the fives, and by 2001 the number of fives awarded rose 
even higher to 55% of the total submissions. Therefore, with so many submissions scoring a five grade 
in 1996 and 2001, it was felt necessary to lift the threshold of performance to the top three RAE grades 
awarded.   
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Exercise can be explained partially by the leader-characteristic of scholarship, the 
study examines whether there is a correlation between a president s lifetime citations 
and the later movement, up or down, in the number of excellent departments in his or 
her institution.   It also controls for institutional revenue, age and the scholarly 
discipline of presidents.  
3.5 Independent Variable:  Presidents Lifetime Citations  
Citations are references to authors in other academic papers as 
acknowledgement of their contribution to a specific research area.   They are used in 
this paper to signify the scholarly ability of each president.  Bibliometric information 
is generally viewed as a reliable indicator of research performance over time (van 
Raan, 2003) and it compares fairly with peer review (Nederhof and van Raan, 1993)12.  
Most academics who go into administrative jobs reduce their research output.  
This depends, somewhat, on their discipline.  The data generated for the purposes of 
this study make it clear that university presidents accumulate the overwhelming 
majority (approximately 95%) of their citations before they become institutional 
leaders.     
For this paper the lifetime citations of British university presidents are 
normalized for discipline13.   Most important when using citations as any kind of 
measure is recognition of the huge differences between disciplines.   For example, a 
highly cited social scientist might have a lifetime citation total of around 1000 
whereas a molecular biologist could have a score over 10,000.  Bibliometric 
indicators have been used more consistently across the sciences than in the humanities 
and social sciences (van Raan, 1998).  These disciplines publish more journal articles 
and have a higher prevalence of co-authorship.   
3.6 Why Use Citations Instead of Journal Articles?  
There is a growing body of work that uses citations to assess intellectual 
output and productivity (see, King, 2004 and Bayers, 2005).  Moreover, citation 
                                                
12
 For an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of using bibliometric data, see van Raan, 1998 and 
Goodall, 2006a.   
13 Citations data collected October 2005 from ISI Web of Knowledge.  Citations to books and articles 
are recorded. 
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counts are a good predictor of professorial salaries (Hamermesh et. al., 1982) and 
Nobel Prizes (Garfield and Welljams-Dorof, 1992).   
An alternative approach is to count an author s published articles and weight 
by journal impact-factors.  However, this presents three problems.  First, monographs 
would be excluded from the data.  Second, the quality of a journal is a noisy measure 
of the future impact of individual articles (Oswald, 2007).  For example, many highly 
cited articles are not published in Grade A journals and vice versa.  Finally, 
assigning weight to journal quality through, for example, ISI Impact Factors might not 
be reliable -- even if they were available -- for papers published 10-20 years ago.   
Furthermore, impact factors still rely on citations to rank journals.  
3.7 Normalizing Citations to P-scores  
In this paper, each university president is assigned a normalized citation score, 
which reflects both the differences across disciplines and their personal citation levels.  
This score is referred to as the P-score = president s individual lifetime citation 
score normalized for discipline.  The P-score has been generated by developing a 
scale that is then used as an exchange rate, normalizing the different citation 
conventions across disciplines.  A description of the normalization process is 
presented in Appendix C. 
The presidents in this study span a number of years, and therefore those who 
are older have, in principle, had longer to accrue citations.  Hence, for example, if the 
presidents with low numbers of citations can be shown to be significantly younger 
than those with high life-time scores, age could be influential.  However, inspection of 
the age profile of all leaders in my dataset finds that there are no age differences 
between those with the highest and lowest citation scores14.   
3.8 Control Variables: Organizational Revenue, Age and Discipline of President   
Three control variables have been included in the regression analysis: 
organizational income, the president s age, and the academic discipline of each 
president.  Allowing for lags, university revenue has been included for years 1992/3 
                                                
14 Age is also not a factor in the cross-sectional studies -- see Goodall a&b. 
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and 1996/715 (figures supplied by the Higher Education Statistics Agency in the UK).  
The income figures include government funded grants, tuition fees and education 
grants and contracts, research grants and contracts, endowment and investment 
income, miscellaneous income and income from services rendered.    
The age variable has been included by calculating the age of an incumbent 
president in 1992 and 1996.   The academic discipline of a president is defined by 
creating two fields, the sciences that are coded 0, and the social sciences and 
humanities coded 1.   
4. Results    
Table 1 gives means and standard deviations for presidents citation scores and 
the university performance variable -- the number of departments that scored an 
excellent grade in Research Assessment Exercises 1992, 1996 and 2001.     
4.1 Cross-Sectional Analysis with Lags    
Initial results can be found in the simple cross-sectional bar diagram in Figure 
1.  The focus here is on the presidents of those universities that made the greatest 
gains, and the smallest gains, in the number of submissions graded excellent between 
RAE 1992 and 2001.  The presidents citations -- on the Y axis -- represent the means 
in P-score between 1992 and 1996.  By design, this allows for a lag. 
As can be seen, the universities that advanced the most during this period -- 
increasing their number of excellent-rated departments -- were disproportionately led 
by presidents with higher lifetime citations.  The mean citation P-score of leaders 
running the UK s top five mover-universities at the start is 13.6 and the mean P-score 
of those heading the top ten mover-universities is 9.6.  However, of the universities 
that accumulated the least number of improved scores across the nine year period -- 
indeed some actually reduced their number -- the citation P-score of leaders for both 
the lowest 5 and 10 universities is 3.1.  Therefore, presidents leading the top twenty 
per-cent of mover-institutions are three times more highly cited, and those leading the 
                                                
15 The income variable was only available for 47 of the 55 universities. This is because no data were 
available to the author for the 8 University of London colleges in 1992 when the revenue figures for 
individual colleges were aggregated into one University of London sum.   
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top ten per-cent of mover-institutions have over four times the lifetime citations of 
those who led the universities that performed least well.   
Tables 2 - 7 report regression equations.  These attempt to establish more 
carefully whether a statistically significant relationship exists between organizational 
performance, the dependent variable, and president s P-score, among other 
independent variables.  In the following tables the effect of the independent variables 
is measured by the coefficients, and the level of significance is given by the t-statistic.   
Results are presented for three time periods.  The first is 1992 to 1996, followed by 
1996 to 2001, and finally the full 9 years, 1992 to 2001.  Given the likely importance 
of lags, the results, incorporating two research exercises that span just under a decade, 
would seem to be the most robust. 
Table 2 gives simple results for the level, or number, of excellent departments, 
or top-fives, gained in 1996 in the RAE, and reports the effects of the independent 
variables in 1992.   
As can be seen, the P-score of a president in 1992 is statistically significantly 
related to the number of top-five departments in 1996.  The coefficient is 0.30 (t-
statistic = 2.29) which is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  Table 2 
also shows that organizational income is statistically significant at the 1% level.   The 
coefficient is 0.10 (t-statistic = 6.27).  But age and discipline of president are not here 
statistically significant16.   
Table 3 gives results for the number of top-five departments in the 2001 RAE 
and reports the effects of the independent variables in 1996, again allowing for a lag 
of five years.  In 2001 the P-score coefficient is 0.53 (t-statistic = 3.04) which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  Again, the finance variable correlates with 
organizational performance.   The coefficient is 0.09 (t-statistic = 7.28).  However, 
there is no statistically significant relationship with either age of leader or their 
academic discipline.   The size of the coefficient on P-score is somewhat mediated by 
adding the extra variables (comparing column 1 to column 4 in Table 3).  
Table 4 again presents cross-sectional evidence but now with a longer lag.   
Results are given for the number of top-five departments in the 2001 RAE and the 
effects of the independent variables in 1992.  This time I allow for a lag of nine years.  
                                                
16 When I enter P-score into the equations after the other independent variables, therefore reversing the 
process shown in these tables, the results stay the same.  This holds for all regression equations 
presented in this paper.   
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Here a leader s P-score, the key independent variable, has been averaged between 
years 1990-94.  By averaging P-score over four years I hope to reduce some 
measurement error insofar as the results are less likely to be driven by one year of 
observation.  Table 4 reports that P-score is statistically significant -- at the 1% level -
- after all independent variables have been included.   Again the finance variable 
correlates with university performance.  
In terms of the size of the effect of P-score, the equation in Table 4 illustrates 
that one extra point in a president s P-score (averaged 1990-1994) raises the number 
of top-five or excellent departments in 2001 by 0.4.   In other words, a hypothetical 10 
point move in a president s P-score is estimated to generate four excellent 
departments in 2001; or three extra departments when other variables are included.  
These are, of course, associations rather than clear cause and effect. 
Although lags are used, the results so far are fundamentally cross-sectional.   
Now we turn to longitudinal analysis where the dependent variable is the change, up 
or down, in performance.    
4.2 Longitudinal Analysis  
Table 5 gives regression equations in which the dependent variable is the 
change in the number of top-five, or excellent, departments, in the Research 
Assessment Exercise between 1992 and 1996.   As can be seen in all columns in Table 
5, the association between P-score in 1992 and the later performance in 1996 is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  The coefficient is approximately 0.13 (t-
statistic = 3.43).  University income does not now, in columns 2-4 of Table 5, have a 
significant effect on the changes over time in the number of top-five departments.   It 
is likely that money is more significant in equations correlating P-score with the 
number of top 5 departments, because income is a proxy for size of an institution.  A 
large university will tend to have more departments.   When focusing on the change 
however, income or size appears less important.    
Columns 3 and 4 show that, again, there is no well-determined effect from the 
age of a president or the academic discipline to which they belong.    
Table 6 shows a slightly different pattern.  In 2001 the number of top-fives is 
statistically unaffected by presidents P-scores five years earlier in 1996.  Although 
the coefficients on P-score across the four columns are not significantly different from 
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zero, they remain positive.   Again, there is no significant effect from income or from 
the age or discipline of a leader.     
A statistically significant relationship between performance and leaders 
lifetime citations is reinstated again in Table 7 when a longer time perspective is 
adopted.  As suggested earlier, this may be a more realistic reflection of the length of 
time needed to improve RAE performance.  Presidents P-scores have again been 
averaged between years 1990-94 as with the previous nine year equation.  
As can be seen, P-scores are correlated with growth in the number of excellent 
departments obtained nine years later in the 2001 RAE.  The coefficient in the first 
column of Table 7 is 0.24 (t-statistic 3.27) and statistical significance is established at 
the 1% level.  Noticeably, the coefficient is double that of the 1992-1996 result 
reported in Table 5.  Finance, age and discipline are not correlated with university 
performance.    In columns 2-4 of Table 7, their inclusion in the regression equation 
leaves the coefficient on P-score approximately unaffected. 
The results presented in Tables 2 through 7 appear to show that a president s 
lifetime citations, or past success as a scholar, are significantly correlated with the 
future number of top grades that a university attains in the RAE.  Conversely, 
university revenue does not affect growth performance.  Using a measure that follows 
the growth in departments rated excellent may be a particularly appropriate gauge of 
RAE performance, because excellence must be reached across all faculty in a given 
unit of assessment.   
The results presented in this paper illustrate the apparent relevance of 
presidents P-scores when explaining universities performance in the UK Research 
Assessment Exercise.   In other words, there is evidence consistent with a statistical, 
and perhaps causal, relationship between the past level of scholarship attained by a 
president and the future performance of their university.    
4.3 Checking for Reverse Causality  
As mentioned above, these kinds of regression equations may favour
institutions that have further to move.  A test for this is to include a variable 
controlling for an institution s original position17.  This check was done by entering 
                                                
17
 Thanks to Ronald Ehrenberg for this suggestion. 
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the number of top-five grades that an institution had in 1992 into a regression 
equation where the dependent variable is the change in top departments from 1992 to 
2001.  When this is done, the results reveal that there is no difference in the statistical 
significance of presidents P-scores, or in the other independent variables of income, 
age and discipline (table not reported).  Therefore, institutions that improve the most 
are not doing so merely because they had the furthest scope to change. 
Checks for reverse causality are done by introducing a series of lags between a 
leader being in place, and the future performance of his or her institution.   Another 
test, in the style of Granger causality18, can be applied that answers the question: are 
today s leaders not merely a reflection of yesterday s performance.  So, for example, a 
distinguished scholar joins a university after, and possibly as a result of, past good 
performance.  This causal chain is different from my hypothesis that scholar leaders 
actually improve performance.    
To safeguard against this, the leaders P-scores in 2001 are regressed on 
universities RAE performance in 1992.   In an equation of this type where the 
independent variable is the number of top-five, or excellent, departments the 
coefficient is 0.035 (t = 0.80).  Thus there is no statistically significant relationship.   
This test goes some way to disproving the argument that the cross-sectional 
correlations, showing that top universities appoint top scholars, are merely a result of 
assortative matching -- put simply, that top universities select distinguished 
researchers as a matter of course, or because they can.     
4.4 Measuring Change on Change    
A full fixed-effects test to examine the impact of leaders on the performance 
of universities would be to regress the change in performance on the change in leader.  
In my study I show, in a number of ways, that those universities that were consistently 
led by better scholars went on to perform better in attaining the highest scores in the 
UK Research Assessment Exercise (RAE).  The paper cannot persuasively show that 
a change in leadership produces a change in performance, because to present such 
evidence would require an extension beyond the nine years lag included in the data.  
Early bibliometric data on university leaders are not currently available in ISI Web of 
                                                
18
 Granger and Newbold, 1974. 
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Knowledge, the source used in this study.  Eventually this problem should be solvable 
when further data become available. 
   
5. Conclusion   
By constructing a new panel data set, the paper shows -- in figures such as 
Figure 1 and tables such as Table 7 -- that the characteristics of a leader in position 
today are correlated with the future performance of the organization.  This appears to 
be the first longitudinal evidence that the appointment of a university president who 
has been a successful researcher can improve the later research performance of their 
university.  It suggests that where the workforce are predominantly experts and 
professionals, it is specialists, not generalists, who should lead.  
The paper s hypothesis is tested using multiple regression analysis, with 
university performance in the UK s Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) as the 
dependent variable, and presidents scholarly achievement as the key independent 
variable.  The focus is on changes in university performance over a nine-year period.   
Control variables for university income, presidential age and discipline are used.   
Although the data-set is inevitably a fairly small one -- it covers a panel of 55 
universities and 157 university presidents -- the inquiry seems to be the first of its 
kind.    
This work adds to a growing empirical literature suggesting that leaders matter 
(Jones and Olken, 2005, study nations and Bertrand and Schoar, 2003, study 
managers).  The paper s findings seem to have policy implications for universities, 
R&D units, and other research and knowledge-intensive organizations.  It appears that 
there is a direct pay-off from having leaders who are technical experts in their field.     
  
15
References  
Adams, J.D. and Clemmons, J.R. 2006. The growing allocative inefficiency of the 
U.S. higher education sector. NBER Working Paper, 12683. 
Bargh, C., Bocock, J., Scott, P. and Smith, D. 2000. University leadership: The role of 
the chief executive. Open University Press: UK. 
Bayers, N.K. 2005. Using ISI data in the analysis of German national and institutional 
research output . Scientometrics, 62: 155-163. 
Bertrand, M. and Schoar, A. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on 
firm policies. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (4): 1169-1208. 
Birnbaum, R. 1988. How colleges work: The cybernetics of academic organization 
and leadership. San Francisco: Josey-Bass.  
Charlton, B.G. and Andras, P. 2007. Evaluating universities using simple 
scientometric research output metrics: total citation counts per university for a 
retrospective seven year rolling sample. Science and Public Policy, 34 (8): 
555-563. 
Cohen, M.D. and March, J.G. 1974. Leadership and ambiguity. McGraw-Hill: New 
York.  
Crespi, G. and Geuna, A. 2006. The productivity of UK universities. Conferences on 
New Political Economy. Forthcoming.  
Ehrenberg, R.G. (Ed) 2004. Governing Academia. USA: Cornell Press. 
Ensley, M.D. and Hmieleski, K.A. 2005. A comparative study of new venture top 
management team composition, dynamics and performance between 
university-based and independent start-ups. Research Policy, 34 (7): 1091-
1105. 
Goodall, A.H. 2006a.  Should research universities be led by top researchers, and are 
they?  Journal of Documentation, 62 (3): 388-411. 
Goodall, A.H. 2006b.  Does it take an expert to lead experts? An empirical study of 
business school deans. Cornell Higher Education Research Institute, Working 
Paper Series 89.   
Garfield, E and Welljams-Dorof, A. 1992. Of Nobel class: A citation perspective on 
high impact research authors. Theoretical Medicine, 13 (2): 117-35. 
Gonzalez-Brambila, C. and Veloso, F.M. 2007. The determinants of research output 
and impact: A study of Mexican researchers. Research Policy, 36 (7): 1035-
1051.    
Granger, C. W. J. and Newbold, P. 1974. Spurious regressions in econometrics. 
Journal of Econometrics, 2: 111-120. 
Gulbrandsen, M. and Smeby, J.C. 2005. Industry funding and university professors' 
research performance. Research Policy, 34 (6): 932-950.  
Hamermesh, D. S., Johnson, G. E. and Weisbrod, B. A. 1982. Scholarship, citations 
and salaries: Economic rewards in economics. Southern Economic Journal, 
49: (2): 472-481. 
Johnes, J. and Johnes, G. 1993. Measuring the research performance of UK 
economics departments an application of data envelopment analysis. Oxford 
Economic Papers-New Series, 45 (2): 332-347. 
Johnes, J. and Johnes, G.  1995. Research funding and performance in UK university 
departments of economics a frontier analysis. Economics of Education 
Review, 14 (3): 301-314. 
Jones, B.F. and Olken, B.A. 2005.  Do leaders matter? National leadership and growth 
since World War II. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120 (3): 835-864.     
  
16
Katz, J.S. 2004. Indicators for complex innovation systems. Research Policy, 35: 893-
909. 
King, D.A. 2004. The scientific impact of nations. Nature, 430: 311-316. 
Lombardi, J.V. Craig, D.D. Capaldi, E.D. and Gater, D.S. 2002. The top American 
research universities: an overview. TheCenter Reports, Gainesville: 
University of Florida.  
Middlehurst, R. 1993. Leading academics. Open University Press: Buckingham, UK.  
Mintzberg, H. 1979. The Structuring of Organizations. Prentice Hall. 
Nederhof, A.J. and van Raan, A.F.J. 1993. A bibliometric analysis of 6 economics 
research groups - a comparison with peer-review. Research Policy, 22 (4): 
353-368.   
Oppenheim, C. 1995. The correlation between citation counts and the 1992 Research 
Assessment Exercise Ratings for British library and information science 
university departments. Journal of Documentation, 51: 18-27. 
Oppenheim, C. 1997. Patent citation analysis.  Scientometrics, 39 (1): 141-141. 
Oppenheim, C. and Stuart, D. 2004. Is there a correlation between investment in an 
academic library and a higher education institution s ratings in the Research 
Assessment Exercise? ASLIB Proceedings, 56: 156-165. 
Oppenheim, C. 2007. Using the h-index to rank influential British researchers in 
information science and librarianship. Journal of the American Society for 
Information Science and Technology, 58: 297-301. 
Oswald, A. J. 2007. An examination of the reliability of prestigious scholarly 
journals: Evidence and implications for decision-makers. Economica, 74: 21-
31. 
Rigby, J. and Edler, J. 2005. Peering inside research networks: Some observations on 
the effect of the intensity of collaboration on the variability of research quality.  
Research Policy, 34 (6): 784-794.   
Rosovsky, H. 1991. The university: An owners manual. New York: Norton. 
Seng, L.B. and Willett, P. 1995. The citedness of publications by United Kingdom 
library schools. Journal of Information Science, 21: 68-71. 
Shattock, M. 2003. Managing Successful Universities. Berkshire: Open University 
Press. 
van Leeuwen, T.N., Moed, H.F. Tijssen, R.J.W. Visser, M.S. and van Raan, A.F.J. 
2001. Language biases in the coverage of the science citation index and its 
consequences for international comparisons of national research performance. 
Scientometrics, 51: 335-346. 
van Raan, A.F.J. 1998. Assessing the social sciences: The use of advanced 
bibliometric methods as a necessary complement to peer review. Research 
Evaluation, 7: 2-6. 
Von Tunzelmann, N., Ranga, L. M. and Debackere, K. 2003. Entrepreneurial 
universities and the dynamics of academic knowledge production: a case study 
of basic vs. applied research in Belgium. Scientometrics, 58: 301-20. 
Zhang, L. and Ehrenberg, R.G. 2006. Faculty employment and R&D expenditures at 
research universities. Cornell Higher Education Research Institute, Working 
Paper 97. 
  
17
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics: Data over Three 
Research Assessment Exercises
 
Means  
(and standard deviations)  
Variables  1992  1996  2001 
President s lifetime citations 
normalized into a P-score  
5.15 
(7.47)  
4.62 
(5.94)  
7.13* 
(21.56) 
Number of excellent  
departments in the university  
#  Universities  
5.82 
(6.82)   
n = 55  
6.13 
(7.43)   
n = 55  
9.6 
(8.13)   
n = 55 
*One president has exceptionally high citations (Anthony Giddens).  When I exclude this observation, 
the P-score mean is 4.38, standard deviation is 6.92. The highly cited president does not influence the 
paper s results.  The key correlations are not affected by this outlier because the calculations in the 
paper allow for lags.  Hence, only presidents P-scores in 1992 and 1996 are used.  The mean P-score 
of presidents in 1992 is 5.15 and the mean P-score of presidents in 1996 is 4.62.     
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FIGURE 1   
Universities that Improved the Most in the 
RAE Between 1992-2001 Were Led by Presidents
With Higher Lifetime Citations 1992-1996
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TABLE 2 
Regression Equations where the Dependent Variable is
the Number of Top Departments in the UK Research
Assessment Exercise in 1996
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 
P-score of president in 1992 0.30* 0.21* 0.20* 0.20* 
(2.29) (2.05) (1.98) (1.96) 
University income in 1992/93  0.10** 0.11** 0.11** 
 
(6.27) (6.56) (6.28) 
Age of president in 1992   0.25 0.26 
 
(1.58) (1.53) 
Discipline of president in 1992¹    0.30 
(0.16) 
R² 0.09 0.54 0.57 0.57 
Constant 4.58 -4.55 -19.05 -19.57 
(3.87**) (-2.71**) (-2.05*) (-1.97*) 
n=55          
     Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses;   **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
     0 = Sciences, 1 = Social Sciences and Humanities        
TABLE 3 
Regression Equations where the Dependent Variable is
the Number of Top Departments in the UK Research
Assessment Exercise in 2001
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 
P-score of president in 1996 0.53** 0.33** 0.33** 0.33** 
(3.04) (2.58) (2.54) (2.49) 
University income in 1996/97  0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 
(7.28) (7.06) (6.87) 
Age of president in 1996   0.04 0.04 
(0.21) (0.21) 
Discipline of president in 1996¹    0.11 
(0.07) 
R² 0.15 0.63 0.62 0.62 
Constant 7.17 -3.08 -5.38 -5.61 
(5.53**) (-1.84) (-0.49) (0.48) 
n=55     
     Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses;   **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
     0 = Sciences, 1 = Social Sciences and Humanities      
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TABLE 4 
Regression Equations where the Dependent Variable is
the Number of Top Departments in the UK Research
Assessment Exercise in 2001
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 
P-score of president average 1990-94 0.42** 0.30** 0.29** 0.29** 
(2.70) (2.61) (2.57) (2.54) 
University income in 1992/93  0.12** 0.11** 0.11** 
 
(6.96) (6.95) (6.69) 
Age of president in 1992   0.20 0.19 
 
(1.20) (1.11) 
Discipline of president in 1992¹    -0.14 
(-0.07) 
R² 0.12 0.59 0.60 0.61 
Constant 7.48 -2.83 -14.47 -14.21 
(5.76**) (-1.62) (-1.48) (-1.35) 
n=55     
   Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses;    **p<0.01 *p<0.05  
   0 = Sciences, 1 = Social Sciences and Humanities        
TABLE 5 
Regression Equations where the Dependent Variable is
the Change in the Number of Top Departments in the UK
Research Assessment Exercises 1992-1996
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 
P-score of president in 1992 0.13** 0.13** 0.12** 0.12** 
(3.43) (3.07) (2.93) (2.90) 
University income in 1992/93  0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.55) (0.64) (0.65) 
Age of president in 1992   0.02 0.02 
(0.36) (0.29) 
Discipline of president in 1992¹    -0.11 
(-0.15) 
R² 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Constant -0.37 -0.61 -2.01 -1.81 
(-1.09) (-0.90) (-0.52) (-0.43) 
n=55        
     Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses;   **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
      0 = Sciences, 1 = Social Sciences and Humanities       
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TABLE 6 
Regression Equations where the Dependent Variable is
the Change in the Number of Top Departments in the UK
Research Assessment Exercises 1996-2001
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 
P-score of president in 1996 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 
(1.03) (0.64) (0.53) (0.40) 
University income in 1996/97  0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.97) (0.86) (0.59) 
Age of president in 1996   -0.00 0.06 
 
(-0.02) (0.43) 
Discipline of president in 1996¹    1.97 
 
(1.64) 
R² 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.09 
Constant 3.08 2.18 2.53 -1.44 
(5.07**) (1.80) (0.32) (0.18) 
n=55     
         Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses;   **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
           0 = Sciences, 1 = Social Sciences and Humanities             
TABLE 7 
Regression Equations where the Dependent Variable is
the Change in the Number of Top Departments in the UK
Research Assessment Exercises 1992-2001
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 
P-score of president average 1990-94 0. 24** 0.22** 0.22** 0.22** 
(3.27) (2.75) (2.76) (2.72) 
University income in 1992/93  0.01 0.01 0.01 
(1.49) (1.30) (1.36) 
Age of president in 1992   -0.01 -0.03 
(-0.14) (-0.28) 
Discipline of president in 1992¹    -0.62 
(-0.46) 
R² 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Constant 2.56 1.17 2.19 3.29 
(4.14) (0.96) (0.31) (0.44) 
n=55     
          Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses; **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
            0 = Sciences, 1 = Social Sciences and Humanities          
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APPENDIX  A.  
Universities in the Sample*   
1. Birkbeck College, London                            
2. Brunel University 
3. City University 
4. Goldsmiths' College, London 
5. Herriot-Watt University 
6. Imperial College, London 
7. King's College, London 
8. London School of Economics 
9. Open University 
10. QMW College, London 
11. Queens College Belfast 
12. Royal Holloway, London 
13. UMIST 
14. University College London 
15. University of Wales, Bangor 
16. University of Wales, Swansea 
17. Wales, Aberystwyth 
18. University of Aberdeen 
19. University of Bath 
20. University of Birmingham 
21. University of Bradford 
22. University of Bristol 
23. University of Cambridge 
24. University of Dundee 
25. University of Durham 
26. University Of East Anglia 
27. University of Edinburgh 
28. University of Essex 
29. University of Exeter 
30. University of Glasgow 
31. University of Hull 
32. University of Keele 
33. University of  
        Kent at Canterbury 
34. University of Lancaster 
35. University of Leeds 
36. University of Leicester 
37. University of Liverpool 
38. Loughborough University 
39. University of Manchester 
40. University of Newcastle  
41. University of Nottingham 
42. University of Oxford 
43. University of Reading 
44. University of Salford 
45. University of Sheffield 
46. University of Southampton 
47. St Andrews University 
48. University of Stirling 
49. University of Strathclyde 
50. University of Surrey 
51. University of Sussex 
52. University of Ulster 
53. University of Wales, Cardiff 
54. University of Warwick 
55. University of York 
* Aston University was excluded from the sample because of their small number of submissions into 
the RAE over the 9 year period, making comparison and performance measurement difficult.  In 1992, 
10 departments were submitted, in 1996, 8 departments and in 2001, 5 were submitted.     
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APPENDIX  B.  
Description of the Data (Means) Across Three Time Periods
 
University Presidents  1980 s  1990 s  2000-2005 
Number of male presidents 54 54 50 
Number of female presidents 1 1 5 
Age of accession to president 52 years 52 years 53 years 
President s lifetime citations 
normalized into a P-score  4.59  7.80*  5.12 
Length of president s tenure 10 8 N/A 
Presidents who were scientists 41 28 24 
Presidents who were social scientists 7 15 17 
Presidents who were humanities 5 10 10 
Presidents who were non-academics  
#  Universities 
2  
n = 55 
2  
n = 55 
4  
n = 55 
*One president has exceptionally high citations (Anthony Giddens).  When we exclude this observation 
the P-score mean is 5.06.  Omitting this president from the analysis leaves the paper s conclusions 
unaffected.  
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APPENDIX  C.  
Citation Normalization Process
 
The discrepancies in citation levels across disciplines are demonstrated in the 
number of new cited references that appear in ISI every week (see over).  The 
sciences generate approximately 350,000 new cited references weekly, the social 
sciences 50,000, and the humanities 15,00019. Although the presidents have different 
disciplinary backgrounds, that require normalization, they are from a single country, 
which presumably improves validity when using citations data as a comparative 
measure.  Language biases have been shown to exist within ISI (van Leeuwen et al., 
2001) but this should not be a problem with a UK cohort.   
The P-score produced through a normalization process makes it possible to do 
like-for-like comparisons between individuals from different disciplines (Goodall, 
2006a). To obtain a P-score, the individual presidential citations were hand-counted, 
totalled, and then divided by the ISI Highly Cited disciplinary thresholds shown 
above. The thresholds are dominated by science subjects, totalling 19. The social 
sciences are also covered, but there are only two social science subject areas, namely 
Economics and Business and Social Sciences General .   Currently, no Highly 
Cited category exists for authors in the arts or humanities.  
The humanities score was created by the author using the previously 
mentioned new cited references generated by ISI each week.  If we divide the social 
science weekly score of 50,000 by the humanities score of 15,000 we get a figure of 
3.33.  The author then divided the Social Sciences, General score of 117 by 3.33 
which creates a score of 35.13.  The number 35 has been used here as the 
Humanities, General score.  Using citation thresholds produced by ISI HiCi, a 
normalized citation score has been produced in this paper for 23 subject areas.   
An effort has been made to try to assign accurately citation numbers to 
people s names.  Though some measurement error must be presumed, two studies that 
adopt different counting methods -- Seng and Willett (1995) who use a very precise 
method on the one hand, and Oppenheim (1995) who assigned citations more 
approximately on the other -- report similar correlations.      
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Citation Thresholds for Scientists in Different Disciplines  
Subject area Scientist 
Agricultural Sciences 154 
Biology and Biochemistry 780 
Chemistry 648 
Clinical Medicine 1095 
Computer Science 84 
Economics and Business 169 
Engineering 182 
Environment/Ecology 248 
Geosciences 433 
Humanities, General* 35 
Immunology 763 
Materials Science 219 
Mathematics 130 
Microbiology 534 
Molecular Biology and Genetics 1234 
Multidisciplinary 123 
Neuroscience and Behaviour 908 
Pharmacology and Toxicology 312 
Physics 1832 
Plant and Animal Science 292 
Psychiatry/Psychology 393 
Social Sciences, General 117 
Space Science 1301 
                 Thomson ISI Highly cited, available from http://in-cites.com/thresholds-citation.html  
                * Humanities score created by Amanda H. Goodall (in Goodall, 2006a).  
Note to Table:  The above citation thresholds represent approximately the top 300 authors in each 
disciplinary field between 1994 - 2004.   
